Answer to Question 1Nothing can be regarded as good in itself, except a good will. A will is good when it acts solely out of duty, i.e. on the basis of respect for universal moral law. Rational beings are ends in themselves.
- Qualities such as intelligence, wit, judgment, etc. can all be put to a wrong use.
Therefore these qualities are not good in themselves, i.e. intrinsically good.
- It is possible to perform correct actions for the wrong reasons, e.g. being honest out of self-interest.
Therefore a good will is not good by virtue of what it accomplishes.
- One would not be good is one were simply programmed to enjoy performing beneficent actions.
Therefore a good will is not good by virtue of enjoying performing beneficent actions.
In Kant's view, a person is good when that person performs an action not because he or she has any natural inclination to perform the action, but rather because he or she recognizes it as his or her duty to perform the action, i.e. he or she is performing the action out of respect for universal moral law. He considers an action to be a duty when the motives prompting that action can be universalized.
Further, in Kant's view, every rational being recognizes himself as having intrinsic worth, i.e. as being something of value. Rationality demands that one recognize that every rational being thinks of his or her existence in this way. According to Kant, this implies that if I am to think of myself as having intrinsic value, then I must also think of others as having intrinsic value. Thus, if I do not think I should be used merely as an ends to a means, neither should I think that other rational beings can be used merely as ends to a means.
Answer to Question 2The chief good is happiness. Human happiness consists in living a virtuous life. Virtue is best defined as a state of character concerned with rationally choosing an intermediate between vices of excess.
- All actions aim at some purpose that is considered desirable, i.e. good.
Some purposes are considered desirable, i.e. good, only insofar as they facilitate the pursuit of some further goal. These purposes are not considered desirable for their own sake, but for the sake of the further goal they promote.
That which is most desirable, i.e. good, is that which is entirely desired for its own sake and never for the sake of something else.
Happiness is the thing that we always choose for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. (Other things such as honor, pleasure, the exercise of reason we may choose for their own sakes, but we also choose them because we think they will make us happy. Happiness, on the other hand, we simply choose for its own sake.
- Those who are happy spend their life in pursuing virtuous activities.
Therefore human good, i.e. happiness, is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.
- Virtue must either be a passion, faculty or a state of character.
Virtue is not a passion, i.e. feeling, since we do not call feelings good or bad simply because we have them, but because we have them in a certain way.
Virtue is not a faculty, i.e. the capacity to have feelings, since we do not call the simple capacity to have a particular feeling good or bad.
Virtue is therefore a state of character. As a state of character it has to do with choosing to feel passions appropriately, i.e. To feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way ... Typically, this will involve choosing an intermediate between two extremes.
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