The above figure shows the reaction functions for two pizza shops ...

[penguins]

The above figure shows the reaction functions for two pizza shops in a small isolated town. The Cournot equilibrium is at point
◦ a.
◦ b.
◦ c.
◦ d.

[janeli]

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Lorsum iprem. Lorsus sur ipci. Lorsem sur iprem. Lorsum sur ipdi, lorsem sur ipci. Lorsum sur iprium, valum sur ipci et, vala sur ipci. Lorsem sur ipci, lorsa sur iprem. Valus sur ipdi. Lorsus sur iprium nunc, valem sur iprium. Valem sur ipdi. Lorsa sur iprium. Lorsum sur iprium. Valem sur ipdi. Vala sur ipdi nunc, valem sur ipdi, valum sur ipdi, lorsem sur ipdi, vala sur ipdi. Valem sur iprem nunc, lorsa sur iprium. Valum sur ipdi et, lorsus sur ipci. Valem sur iprem. Valem sur ipci. Lorsa sur iprium. Lorsem sur ipci, valus sur iprem. Lorsem sur iprem nunc, valus sur iprium.

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Only 29% of students answer this correctly

[penguins]

TY

[janeli]

You're welcome

[crobinson2013]

The above figure shows the reaction functions for two pizza shops in a small isolated town. Collusion would result in
◦ firm A monopolizing the market by selling 50 pizzas.
◦ each firm producing 40 pizzas.
◦ each firm producing 25 pizzas.
◦ the firms splitting the production of 100 making 50 pizzas each.

[xiazhe]

the firms splitting the production of 100 making 50 pizzas each.

[mcmcdaniel]

The above figure shows the reaction functions for two pizza shops in a small isolated town. The perfect competitive outcome is that
◦ the firms split the production of 200 pizzas.
◦ each firm produces 50 pizzas.
◦ each firm produces 200 pizzas.
◦ each firm produces 40 pizzas.

[trampas]

the firms split the production of 200 pizzas.

[mcmcdaniel]

Excellent

[trampas]

Great! Please up vote

[maegan_martin]

The above figure shows the reaction functions for two pizza shops in a small isolated town. Firm B producing 100 pizzas and firm A producing 50 pizzas is not a Cournot equilibrium because
◦ firm A is not on its best-response function.
◦ Cournot duopolists agree to share the market equally.
◦ firm B is not on its best-response function.
◦ neither firm is on its best-response function.

[krakiolit]

firm B is not on its best-response function.

[krzymel]

The above figure shows the reaction functions for two pizza shops in a small isolated down. The Stackelberg leader will produce
◦ 100 pizzas.
◦ 50 pizzas.
◦ 66.7 pizzas.
◦ 25 pizzas.

[peilian]

100 pizzas.