A risk-averse manager is hired to run a firm for shareholders. If shareholders cannot observe the manager's effort, which would be the best employment contract?
a. a high-powered incentive contract to elicit maximum effort.
b. a fixed salary.
c. a moderately powered incentive scheme that elicits some effort without exposing the manager to too much risk.
d. an incentive scheme that provides maximum incentives and maximum insurance.
Question 2
A risk-averse manager is hired to run a firm for shareholders. If the manager's effort can be observed and specified in a contract, which would be the best employment contract?
a. a high-powered incentive contract to elicit the most effort.
b. a fixed salary paid as long as the required effort is undertaken.
c. a proportion of profits paid as long as the required effort is undertaken.
d. a wage well in excess of his or her outside opportunity.
Risk for injury
In this photo opportunity, Phillies manager Ben Chapman refused to shake Jackie Robinson’s hand. ...
Men who are at risk for heart disease and report work-related stressors are at greater risk of death ...
Summary of Hale’s Lactation Risk Categories
Stroke Risk Factors
Percentage of youth age 15 to 19 years with at-risk levels of body composition & fitness