Which of the following is a true statement about signaling games? ...

[formula1]

Which of the following is a true statement about signaling games?
 a. In a separating equilibrium, the second mover's posterior beliefs are the same as his priors.
  b. In a separating equilibrium, Bayes' rule cannot be used to compute posterior beliefs (because it produces an undefined answer).
  c. In a pooling equilibrium, both the first and second movers choose the same action.
  d. In a pooling equilibrium, the second mover learns nothing from the first mover's action.

Question 2

The starting point of many methods for predicting equilibrium strategy in sequential games is
 a. designing proactive reactions to rival actions
  b. information sets
  c. uncertain outcomes
  d. backwards induction based on an explicit order of play
  e. endgame analysis

[prumorgan]

Answer to Question 1

d

Answer to Question 2

e

[formula1]

TYSM

[Laurenleakan]

Excellent