Author Question: If the Battle of the Sexes game were played sequentially, A) one of the two pure strategy ... (Read 52 times)

Collmarie · **on:** Jul 1, 2018

If the Battle of the Sexes game were played sequentially,

A) one of the two pure strategy equilibria would become the only equilibrium.
B) the two pure strategy equilibria would alternate in being the equilibrium seen in each round of the game.
C) only the mixed strategy equilibrium would exist.
D) only the dominant strategy equilibrium would exist.
E) the equilibrium would not change.

Question 2

The principal-agent problem in corporations exists because the managers of a firm

A) may pursue their own goals even when the result is lower profit for owners.
B) may know how to operate the business better than absentee owners do, and yet not be allowed to.
C) are generally unable to do the monitoring that would result in the firm's avoiding moral hazard problems.
D) are generally unable to do the monitoring that would result in the firm's avoiding adverse selection.
E) are generally unable to monitor workers, who do not care about the profits due the managers.