Suppose duopolists face the market inverse demand curve P = 100 - ...

[lindiwe]

Suppose duopolists face the market inverse demand curve P = 100 - Q, Q = q1 + q2, and both firms have a constant marginal cost of 10. If firm 1 is a Stackelberg leader and firm 2's best response function is , at the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium firm 2's output is
◦ 30.
◦ 70.
◦ 60.
◦ 40.

[wuly]

30.

[jayhills49]

Suppose duopolists face the market inverse demand curve P = 100 - Q, Q = q1 + q2, and both firms have a constant marginal cost of 10 and no fixed costs. If firm 1 is a Stackelberg leader and firm 2's best response function is , at the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium firm 2's profit is
◦ 1200.
◦ 400.
◦ 650.
◦ 800.

[cam1229]

800.

[jayhills49]

Thank you!

[cam1229]

Always glad to help...