Answer to Question 1Reverse discrimination, i.e. affirmative action, in the sense of hiring or admitting a slightly less well qualified woman or black, rather than a slightly more qualified white male, is morally justified.
Hettinger defends his main claim by arguing that objections to affirmative action are mistaken. He considers five objections which he sees as carrying no weight and two objections that he sees as carrying some weight, but which are legitimately overridden because of the great good which affirmative action accomplishes.
Objections Which Carry No Weight
- Objection: Affirmative action is morally equivalent to racism and sexism, inasmuch as it discriminates on the basis of race and sex.
Reply: affirmative action is not morally equivalent to racism and sexism, since its motives and consequences are quite different than those of racism and sexism.
- Objection: Race and sex are irrelevant characteristics that should not be taken into consideration in decisions of hiring or admission.
Reply: Given that racial and sexual inequalities exist as a result of prejudice, it is not wrong to focus on the characteristics of race and sex to address the injustice of racism and sexism.
- Objection: Affirmative action involves unjust stereotyping, inasmuch as it judges people by alleged average characteristics of a class to which they belong rather than as individuals, e.g. not all white males have enjoyed more advantages than all blacks or women.
Reply: Hettinger acknowledges that this objection would have some force against compensatory, i.e. backwards-looking justifications of affirmative action. He holds that it has no force against his defense of affirmative action on the basis of the overall present and future good it produces in society, i.e. a forward-looking utilitarian justification.
- Objection: Affirmative action is unjust in that it denies our moral obligation to hire the most qualified person.
Reply: Hettinger considers the various ways in which preferential hiring of blacks and women might be considered morally questionable and attempts to refute them.
(a) He argues that preferential hiring is not unjust on the basis of hiring a less efficient person, since there is no moral obligation to hire the most efficient worker. (His view here may presuppose a broad rather than narrow view of the social responsibility of business. For a further elaboration see the introduction to Chapter Sixteen of the text.
(b) He denies that the most qualified person has a right to the job on the grounds that people do not have rights to specific jobs.
(c) He denies that the most qualified candidate deserves the job, since it is not clear that qualifications correspond with desert or merit.
(d) He denies that the most qualified person is entitled to the job, since he thinks there is no social contract that guarantees the most qualified person will get the job. He points out that there is widespread acceptance in society of procedures which depart from hiring on the basis of merit or qualification.
- Objection: Affirmative action undermines equal opportunity for white males.
Reply: Affirmative action only takes away the greater than equal opportunity white males have, thus bringing about a situation in which there is greater equal opportunity.
Objections Which Carry Some Weight
- Objection: Affirmative action is morally undesirable, insofar as it makes judgments on the basis of involuntary characteristics.
Reply: It is morally undesirable to make judgments on the basis of involuntary characteristics, but in the case of affirmative action it is nevertheless justified in the light of the greater good it accomplishes.
- Objection: Affirmative action is morally unjustified because it burdens innocent white males without compensation.
Reply: It is morally undesirable to make innocent white males bear the burden of affirmative action without compensation, but this undesirable aspect is justified on the utilitarian grounds that affirmative action produces a great good and that the burden is not substantial.
Answer to Question 2In discussing professional ethics it is useful to focus on the excuses that are typically employed by professionals for failing to fulfill their professional duties.
There is reason to believe that the real problems facing professionals are not ones of learning what is morally correct, but of acting in accordance with what is morally correct.
It is therefore useful to focus on the excuses typically made for not acting in accordance with what is morally correct.
On the basis of this conclusion, McDowell goes on to discuss four types of excuses. These are:
- Excuses Involving Claims of Ignorance
McDowell is skeptical of the factual accuracy of most claims of ignorance of what professional ethics requires. Even when the claim is correct it cannot be accepted as a valid excuse, since it is the duty of a professional to know her ethical obligation.
- Excuses Involving Transfer of Responsibility
Perhaps the most common excuse is that a particular ethical breach was not the agent's responsibility. Evaluating the validity of such an excuse is complicated. Professionals increasingly work in teams in which it may be difficult to determine individual responsibility for ethical lapses in complex professional operations. This difficulty may be seen as pointing to the need for absolute or non-fault liability and for exploring the concept of collective responsibility.
- Excuses Involving Claims of Irrestible Pressure
McDowell distinguishes four sub-types of this excuse. These are claims that:
(a) one has to act unethically to keep pace with competitors.
(b) one is expected to act unethically by one's employer.
(c) one is expected to demonstrate group loyalty.
(d) one is expected to meet financial pressures.
McDowell comments that, in addition to requiring professionals to be strong enough to resist such claims, we ought to consider redesigning social structures and the way professional services are delivered so as to minimize such pressures.
- Excuses Involving the Fault of Machines
Technology is so complex that one must rely on technical experts. No single person can be responsible for the functioning of incredibly complex and integrated technological systems.
McDowell holds that the latter three categories of excuse can possess a degree of validity. To what degree they are valid or simply rationalizations is difficult to determine and will depend on the circumstances of each situation. There is the further issue that bad institutional structures may also play a role in producing actions that run counter to professional ethics. Any discussion of professional wrongdoing needs to take into consideration the institutional setting in which professionals work.