Author Question: The power of an agent to do whatever is reasonable and customary to carry out the agency purpose is ... (Read 60 times)

sabina · **on:** Jun 24, 2018

The power of an agent to do whatever is reasonable and customary to carry out the agency purpose is given by:
a. express authority b. verbal authority
c. quasi authority d. false authority
e. none of the other choices are correct

Question 2

Mental Incompetence. Frank Feiden was diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease in 1982. On January 11, 1986, during a hospital stay for surgery Feiden conveyed his farm to his sons, Harry and Norman. Harry was deeded a larger share of the property than Norman. Norman asked a court to set the deeds aside, alleging that his father was not mentally competent when the deeds were signed. Medical evidence introduced at trial conflicted. A physician, a psychiatrist, and an attorney all testified that when they had seen Frank at various times during 1985 and early 1986, Frank had been unable to handle his financial affairs or understand the legal consequences of his actions. Another psychiatrist, however, testified that Frank had lucid intervals. The attorney who obtained Frank's signatures on the deeds stated that Frank understood what he was signing and was aware that he was deeding more of the property to Harry than to Norman. The nursing summaries indicated that on the day that the deeds were signed, Frank was having lucid periods. How should the court rule? Explain fully.

pallen55 · **Reply #1 on:** Jun 24, 2018

Answer to Question 1

e

Answer to Question 2

Mental incompetence
The court held that the deeds were valid. A state intermediate appellate court held that Feiden might have been competent at the time of signing and deferred to the trial court's judgment on the issue. The deeds were held valid. The appellate court explained, A party's competence is presumed and the party asserting incapacity bears the burden of proving incompetence. Persons suffering from a disease such as Alzheimer's are not presumed incompetent and may execute a valid deed. Furthermore, it must be shown that, because of the affliction, the person was incompetent as the time of the transaction. The trial judge was in a better position to assess the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Here, although the medical evidence was contradictory, we find nothing improper in the trial court's crediting one opinion over another. Because there was no direct proof that Frank was not lucid, alert or oriented at the time of the transaction, the presumption of incompetency was not overcome.