The Nash equilibrium for both stores is a. For megastore to ...

[DyllonKazuo]

The Nash equilibrium for both stores is
 a. For megastore to advertise and for superstore to advertise
  b. For megastore to advertise and for superstore not to advertise
  c. For megastore not to advertise and for superstore to advertise
  d. For megastore not to advertise and for superstore not to advertise

Question 2

In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, a player is willing to randomize because:
 a. this confuses opponents.
  b. he or she is indifferent between the actions in equilibrium.
  c. the actions provide the same payoffs regardless of what the other player does.
  d. he or she does not know what the other player is doing.

[matt]

Answer to Question 1

a

Answer to Question 2

b