In a labor-market pooling equilibrium with high-skill and low-skill workers and where a costly educational degree is used as a signaling device, all else equal, an increase in the wage differential between high- and low-skill workers leads to
A) an increase in the required minimum share of high-skill workers.
B) a decrease in the required minimum share of high-skill workers.
C) no change in the required minimum share of high-skill workers.
D) None of the above answers are correct.
Question 2
In a labor-market separating equilibrium with high-skill and low-skill workers and where a costly educational degree is used solely as a signal device, government can increase total social welfare by
A) subsidizing school for low-skill workers.
B) subsidizing school for all workers.
C) eliminating schooling, i.e., banning wasteful signaling.
D) subsidizing school for high-skill workers.
Striking examples where high surface area releases heat.
(c) snow in Nunavut, alter the local albedo, causing altered microclimates. High albedos are found
The High Plains Aquifer
Efficient Allocation of Labor between Sectors
Overallocation of Labor to Sector 1
Iraqi market