Special interests have an incentive to become informed about a ...

[EY67]

Special interests have an incentive to become informed about a policy from which they could receive concentrated benefits.
 
  Since other voters remain rationally ignorant of the policy, the special interests will have considerable influence in the legislature. Will special interests receive everything they want from the legislature? Why or why not? How will the legislature determine what the special interests will receive?

Question 2

Which of the following statements best describes a production function?
 
  A) the maximum profit generated from given levels of inputs
  B) the maximum level of output generated from given levels of inputs
  C) all levels of output that can be generated from given levels of inputs
  D) all levels of inputs that could produce a given level of output

[voltaire123]

Answer to Question 1

Special interests will not likely get everything they want because there are often special interests on both sides of an issue. So even if most voters remain rationally ignorant, special interests who stand to be harmed by the enactment of a policy will devote effort to stopping the policy by imposing political costs on the legislature. Legislators will give the special interests what they want until the marginal political benefit of doing so is equal to the marginal political cost.

Answer to Question 2

B

[EY67]

TYSM

[lcapri7]

Thanks for the timely response, appreciate it