Answer to Question 1
The Court began to turn its attention to the right to counsel at other stages of the criminal process. This right is tied primarily to the Sixth Amendment, but the Court found support for the right to counsel on the grounds of self-incrimination, due process, and equal protection.
The Supreme Court announced (1) whether potential substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation, and (2) whether counsel can help avoid that prejudice. The familiar Miranda case held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination grants suspects the right to counsel during custodial interrogations because of the inherent coerciveness of such activities. Furthermore, the right to counsel during custodial interrogations applies before or after commencement of formal adversary proceedings.
The right to counsel also stems from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but only in certain circumstances. The Fourteenth Amendment has been used to justify the right to counsel primarily in criminal appeals and probation or parole revocation hearings.
Answer to Question 2
Though the Sixth Amendment provides for the right to counsel, accused individuals sometimes prefer to mount a pro se defense to represent themselves in court. Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, criminal defendants have a constitutional right to represent themselves at trial.
The Court also emphasized in Faretta that the framers viewed the inestimable worth of free choice as more important than the right to counsel. Also, to force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead the defendant to believe that the law contrives against him.
Not every defendant who wishes to proceed without counsel is allowed to do so, however. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court stated that a defendant may only waive counsel if the waiver is competent and intelligent. This language was clarified in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), when the Court noted that the record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence must show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not a waiver.
The Court held that a judge can appoint standby counsel to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant's achievement of his own clearly indicated goals. When waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, a judge's decision to appoint standby counsel will not be unconstitutional as long as (1) the defendant retains control over the case and (2) the jury understands that the defendant represents himself or herself.